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In recent years, there has been extensive discussion about the relation between 
reasons and values. Many authors endorse the so-called Buck-Passing Account of 
Value (BPA) (Scanlon 1998). According to BPA, facts about reasons explain facts 
about goodness: an object’s property of being good is the second-order property of 
having other properties that give agents reasons to respond with pro-attitudes to 
the object (Schroeder 2009; Rønnow-Rasmussen 2011; Rowland 2013). BPA has 
several advantages: it is metaphysically parsimonious (Suikkanen 2009), it 
demystifies value (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004; Lang 2008), and it 
explains the normativity of value (Dancy 2000; Heuer 2006; McHugh and Way 
2016). However, it also faces serious objections. A well-known objection is the 
wrong kind of reason problem (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004, 2006; 
Danielsson and Olson 2007; Lang 2008; Rowland 2013; Kauppinen 2014. Agents 
can have reasons for pro-attitudes towards objects that are not good. Furthermore, 
different values can involve reasons for the same kinds of response, and 
proponents of BPA have difficulties explaining how we can discriminate between 
such values (Crisp 2005; Väyrynen 2006). Another problem for BPA is that the 
deontic realm is not coextensive with the evaluative realm because a reason is 
always a reason for someone, but objects can be good independently of any valuing 
agent (Dancy 2000; Bykvist 2009; Hurka 2014). Finally, it has been objected that 
reasons cannot be the normative primitive because they can be evaluated 
themselves (Gregory 2014, 2016). 
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These apparent problems have motivated new research on the prospects of value-
based theories of reasons (Orsi 2013; Maguire 2016). According to such a theory, 
facts about value explain facts about reasons. Value-based theories of practical 
reasons are well suited to avoid the objections against BPA. However, they also 
face problems. This paper is part of the broader research project of exploring the 
prospects of value-based theories of practical reasons. Of course, it is not possible 
to defend such a theory in detail in one paper. What I aim to do is defend a value-
first view against one objection in particular—namely the problem of agent-relative 
reasons. 
The problem is this. Once it is assumed that a value-based theory of practical 
reasons is plausible, it is also plausible to suppose that all value is agent-neutral. 
Value is agent-neutral if a relation of the valuable entity to a specific agent is no 
fundamental good-making property, and this is an intuitively plausible view. For 
example, what makes my pleasure or the well-being of my children good is not the 
fact that it is my pleasure or the well-being of my children—that would be quite an 
eccentric view. Rather, pleasure or the well-being of persons is good, and this 
goodness can occur in my life or the life of my children. Agent-neutrally good 
entities can be good for agents, and the existence of an agent-neutrally good entity 
can depend on a specific agent (my pleasure is plausibly good for me, and it only 
exists because I exist), but the goodness of an agent-neutrally valuable entity does 
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not depend on the identity of the agent.1 Now, if facts about value explain facts 
about reasons, and if the goodness of an entity does not depend on the identity of 
any particular agent, then it seems natural to suppose that value generates the same 
reasons for all agents. But commonsense morality acknowledges so-called agent-
relative reasons—reasons that differ from agent to agent. Suppose that your 
daughter and my daughter are both drowning, and that there is only one life 
preserver. Both your daughter drowning and my daughter drowning are bad states 
of affairs and, on a value-based theory of reasons, this means that both states of 
affairs give us both reason to throw the life preserver into the water. They might 
 
1 In recent years, there have been several accounts of “value” that make the idea of “agent-neutral 
value” appear problematic, especially context-sensitive accounts of goodness. Examples include 
Stephen Finlay’s (2014) account that understands goodness claims as relative to ends, and 
Michael Ridge’s (2014) account that understands goodness claims as relative to standards. 
According to such views, value is always relative (to ends, or standards, or whatever), and since 
the relevant standards or ends might include pronominal back-reference, the assumption that all 
value is agent-neutral value might appear problematic. 
I cannot discuss here these context-sensitive accounts of goodness in the detail they deserve. 
However, some points deserve mention. Barry Maguire (2016, 234n2) points out that Finlay’s 
view allows for quite idiosyncratic ends, and that his view therefore counterintuitively allows for 
bad or worthless ends to generate reasons. And Rowland (2016) puts forward some arguments 
against Ridge in favor of the intuitively plausible view that entities can be good simpliciter rather 
than context-sensitively good. Following these arguments, I think the idea of agent-neutral value 
has the important advantage of being intuitively compelling. It is also in line with the 
phenomenology of value experience: when we experience something as good, we typically 
experience it as not entirely up to us whether the thing is good, and we often experience it as 
good simpliciter, rather than as good-relative-to-some-X. It would require more work to defend 
the agent-neutral account of value in detail. In any case, its intuitive persuasiveness makes it a 
view that is at least worth exploring. I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point. 
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even give us both reason to throw it to any of these girls. But commonsense 
morality clearly suggests that I have a special reason to throw the life preserver to 
my daughter, and you have a special reason to throw it to your daughter. But if 
value is understood as agent-neutral value, if the goodness of your daughter’s 
survival has nothing to do with you in particular, and if the goodness of my 
daughter’s survival has nothing to do with me in particular, then it is difficult to see 
why these states of affairs give us different reasons. The question, then, is how 
such agent-relative reasons can be accommodated within a value-based theory of 
reasons that understands value as agent-neutral. 
Many authors doubt that this is possible. Some conclude that agent-relative reasons 
are not grounded in value and that they therefore speak against value-based 
theories of reasons (McNaughton and Rawling 1992; Jeske 2008; Wallace 2010; 
Chappell 2014). Others propose abandoning an agent-neutral understanding of 
value and adopting an agent-relative understanding of value instead (Smith 2003, 
2009; Louise 2004; Portmore 2011).2 
Against these authors, I will offer a novel account of how to accommodate agent-
relative reasons within an agent-neutral, value-first framework. I will explain agent-
relative reasons in terms of second-order value responses: when an agent acts on 
her agent-relative reasons, she responds appropriately to her own appropriate value 
response. The gist of this paper is expository: I will explain the view, rather than 
 
2 For some problems with the notion of agent-relative value, see Schroeder (2007a). These 
problems also support an agent-neutral understanding of value. 
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discuss alternative views. However, since it offers an answer to an important 
objection against an agent-neutral, value-based theory of practical reasons, it also 
speaks in favor of such a view, at least indirectly. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, I lay out what a plausible version of 
a value-based theory of reasons might look like. I then explain the agent-
relative/agent-neutral distinction in some detail. Subsequently, I present the view of 
agent-relative reasons in terms of second-order value responses. I conclude by 
briefly mentioning some advantages of the view. 
 
2. Reasons as appropriate value responses 
Value-based theories of practical reasons are usually associated with 
consequentialism.3 Consequentialists understand practical reasons as reasons to 
promote valuable states of affairs. Hence, consequentialists interpret the value-
based theory of reasons in the following way: 
 
Consequentialist Reasons (CR. An agent has a reason to φ iff (and because) her 
φ-ing would promote some valuable state of affairs S.4 
 
3 Some authors identify consequentialism with the attempt to explain reasons in terms of 
goodness. See, for example, Nair (2014). 
4 Many consequentialists also hold a specific view of moral requirements: agents are required to 




CR has two important features. First, it is a teleological conception of 
practical reasons (Portmore 2011; Nye, Plunkett, and Ku 2015). It understands 
practical reasons as goal oriented in the sense that they are reasons to bring about 
possible worlds. Second, according to CR, states of affairs are the bearers of value. 
The value of S provides reasons for action, not some object that constitutes or is 
part of S. 
Neither of these features is a necessary commitment for a value-based theory of 
reasons. It is also possible to interpret practical reasons more broadly as reasons for 
appropriate value responses: 
 
Reasons as Appropriate Value Responses (AVR. An agent has a reason to φ iff 
(and because) her φ-ing would constitute an appropriate response to some 
agent-neutral value V. 
 
AVR can be interpreted in a way that is identical to CR: if V stands for the 
value of a state of affairs S and if the appropriate response to V is to promote S, 
then AVR and CR amount to the same view. But AVR is also compatible with a 
pluralist account of value bearers, as well as with the view that other kinds of value 
responses than promotion can be appropriate. For example, AVR is compatible 
with the Kantian view that persons are bearers of value, and that the appropriate 
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response to the value of a person is to respect her. Since AVR is broader and 
compatible with many different views, I will rely on it in what follows.5 
To see in what sense agent-relative reasons pose a problem for AVR, let me now 
elaborate on the distinction between agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral 
reasons in some detail. 
 
3. The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction 
The distinction between agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons is one of 
the most important findings in twentieth-century ethical theory (Hurka 2003; 
Hammerton 2016). Among other things, it is a criterion for the plausibility of a 
moral theory.6 A theory that cannot accommodate agent-relative reasons is 
deficient for that very reason.7 
What exactly makes a reason agent-relative? On a common understanding, a reason 
is agent-relative if its full specification includes an ineliminable pronominal back-
reference to the agent for whom it is a reason, and it is agent-neutral otherwise 
(Nagel 1986; McNaughton and Rawling 1998; Darwall 2006). It is common to 
 
5 I cannot offer a full defense of AVR here. My point is simply that AVR does not settle a 
number of other controversial matters. This makes it a good working hypothesis for proponents 
of a value-based theory of reasons. 
6 See Ridge (2011) for further ways in which the distinction matters. 
7 Kagan (1989) denies that a convincing moral theory must acknowledge agent-relative reasons. 
But this is a minority position. 
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distinguish between three kinds of agent-relative reasons, namely project-
dependent reasons, relationship-dependent reasons, and restrictions (Nagel 1986).8 
Project-dependent reasons are reasons that stem from the personal projects of 
agents: Arnold has a special reason to pursue his project. Relationship-dependent 
reasons stem from the personal relationships of agents: Bernard has a special 
reason to benefit his loved one or express his commitment to a relationship. And 
restrictions are reasons not to perform acts of certain types: Christine has a special 
reason not to lie herself, rather than prevent others from lying. There might be other 
kinds of agent-relative reasons,9 but these three kinds are widely recognized as 
paradigm cases, and I will focus on them in what follows. 
There is some disagreement in the literature on how to interpret the reference to 
the agent. Some authors understand it as a motivational feature (Pettit 1987, 1988; 
Double 1999). On this interpretation, the fact that my daughter is drowning 
motivates me to jump into the water to save her. This interpretation is incomplete 
at best: the reference to the agent certainly plays a normative role and (partly) 
explains why an agent ought to act in a certain way. Most people think that a father 
who saves a stranger from drowning rather than his daughter does not merely 
exhibit a motivational shortcoming but fails to act on a normative reason to save 
his daughter and acts wrongly. Hence, the reference to the agent seems to be 
 
8 Nagel calls project-dependent reasons “reasons of autonomy” and relationship-dependent 
reasons “reasons of obligation.” 
9 Dancy (1993) identifies seven kinds of agent-relative reasons. 
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relevant in a normative sense and, again, this can mean several things. It can mean 
that the reference to the agent is normatively relevant because it generates a reason, 
and that the fact that my daughter is drowning gives me an agent-relative reason to 
save her. A reason is therefore agent-relative if it is a reason only for the agent but 
not for everybody (Raz 1986; Scheffler 2004; Jeske 2008; Keller 2013). But it can 
also mean that the reference to the agent affects the normative force of an already 
existing reason (van Willigenburg 2005; Wallace 2010. The fact that a girl is 
drowning gives me a reason to save her, but the fact that this girl is my daughter 
intensifies the force of that reason for me. On the first view, a reason is agent-
relative if it exists only for the agent who has it: I have an agent-relative reason to 
save my daughter that Frank, who is not her father, does not have (even though 
Frank has an agent-neutral reason to save her). On the second interpretation, a 
reason is agent-relative if it has different authority over different agents: Frank and 
I both have the same reason to save my daughter (because we both have reason to 
save a drowning child), but my reason to save that particular child is stronger than 
Frank’s.10 
 
10 Depending on one’s metaphysical views about reasons, these two interpretations need not 
come apart. Some authors think that there is such a thing as a complete reason which consists of 
all the normatively relevant features of a situation (Raz 2000; Heuer 2006). If the features that 
determine the strength of a reason are among this set of relevant considerations, then the 
strength of the same reason cannot differ in two situations because two reasons that differ in 
strength are two different (complete) reasons. 
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Both interpretations of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction pose a similar 
problem for AVR. According to AVR, practical reasons are reasons for appropriate 
value responses. Proponents of VR should therefore accept something like the 
following account of agent-relative reasons: 
 
Agent-Relative Reasons AVR: A reason is agent-relative if its constituting an 
appropriate response to a certain agent-neutral value V depends on the 
identity of the responding agent, and it is agent-neutral otherwise.11 
 
So, for example, I have an agent-relative reason to risk my life in order to 
save my daughter from drowning or to throw a life preserver to my daughter rather 
than to two children of a stranger because these responses to the value of my 
daughter are appropriate for me. But they might not be appropriate responses for 
strangers and, in this sense, I have agent-relative reason to do these things that 
other people do not have. 
Note that the notion of appropriateness is not an overall notion here. The issue is 
not whether the appropriateness of an overall response to a situation depends on 
the identity of the agent, but whether the appropriateness of a response to a certain 
value does. This is important for the account to yield the right results. For example, 
it leaves open the possibility that an action is supported both by agent-relative and 
 
11 Thanks to Tristram McPherson for suggesting this formulation to me. 
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agent-neutral reasons.12 This can happen when an agent can respond to more than 
one value at once by performing some action. Suppose, for example, that my only 
options right now are to press a button or refrain from doing so.13 If I press the 
button, millions of strangers will be saved from disaster. This is intuitively an agent-
neutral reason to press the button. Suppose furthermore that I enjoy pressing the 
button, which is intuitively an agent-relative reason for me to press the button. In 
such a case, the appropriateness of me pressing the button does not depend on the 
latter reason since the former is so strong; and it is certainly appropriate for 
everybody to press the button. Hence, the appropriate overall response to the 
situation (namely pressing the button) does not differ from agent to agent and 
therefore does not depend on my identity in particular. Nevertheless, I do have an 
agent-relative reason to press the button since pressing the button is also an 
appropriate response to the value of the pleasure that I get from doing so. Hence, 
in this case, one and the same overall response is supported by an agent-relative as 
well as an agent-neutral reason. And, of course, we can also imagine cases in which 
an agent has agent-neutral reason to do one thing, but agent-relative reason to do 
another—it all depends on the agent-neutral values that the agent can respond to in 
a given situation. And this is how it should be: every plausible account of agent-
relative and agent-neutral reasons should allow for the possibility of such reasons 
to conflict. 
 
12 I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point. 
13 I thank Tristram McPherson for this example. 
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Understanding agent-relative reasons in terms of appropriate responses to specific 
agent-neutral values rather than in terms of the appropriateness of overall 
responses is also important because otherwise the following problem could arise. 
As an anonymous referee pointed out to me, it is only possible to compare the 
appropriateness of different agents performing the same action when we think of 
the action as a type, and once we describe the act of saving one’s daughter as an 
instance of the act type “daughter saving” (which by definition one only performs 
by rescuing his or her own daughter), then the account might let my reason to save 
my daughter appear agent-neutral. After all, it is appropriate for everyone to save 
their own daughter, and the appropriateness of my response therefore does not 
seem to depend on my specific identity. But once we understand agent-relative 
reasons in terms of appropriate responses to specific agent-neutral values and not 
in terms of overall responses, this problem does not arise. The question is what 
response to the value of this specific child is appropriate for me. And as a response to 
this specific value, it is appropriate for me to do different things than is appropriate 
for strangers to do. 
We can now see what problem agent-relative reasons pose for a value-based theory 
of reasons. If all value is agent-neutral value, then it seems natural to suppose that 
the appropriateness of a value response is determined by V, not by the responding 
agent, and the appropriateness of a value response should not vary across agents. 
Hence, if the drowning of my daughter is agent-neutrally bad, then everybody 
should have the same reason to respond to this (dis-)value. But agent-relative 
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reasons suggest otherwise. The question that proponents of a value-based theory of 
practical reasons must answer is how it can be appropriate for different agents to 
respond differently to the same agent-neutral value. 
In what follows, I will set out to answer this question and offer a novel account of 
accommodating agent-relative reasons within an AVR approach that understands 
value as agent-neutral. This account will cover all kinds of agent-relative reasons 
and show that they have a unified rationale, which I take to be an advantage of the 
account.14 More specifically, I will explain agent-relative reasons in terms of higher-
order value responses. Let me explain. 
 
4. Agent-relative reasons as second-order value responses 
There are two broad strategies to accommodate agent-relative reasons within AVR. 
First, one can start with some agent-neutrally valuable entity and then go on to 
explain why it is appropriate for different agents to respond differently to this 
entity. Proponents of this strategy therefore start with the plausible claim that the 
survival of my daughter is good and then go on to try to explain why different 
responses to my daughter’s survival are appropriate for you and for me 
 
14 Not all authors might agree: some authors accept project- and relationship-dependent reasons 
but reject restrictions (Scheffler 1982; Jeske 2001; McNaughton and Rawling 2013). However, 
since one important motivation to accommodate agent-relative reasons within a moral theory is 
that they are intuitively compelling, and since restrictions are intuitively compelling, it seems 
desirable to develop an account that includes restrictions. 
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respectively. The underlying assumption is that when my daughter is drowning and 
I jump into the water, while you throw a life preserver into the water and call for 
help, we both respond to the same valuable entity (the value of my daughter, or 
perhaps the value of the state of affairs of my daughter surviving), but different 
responses are appropriate for us. Many authors endorse this strategy, and while I 
do not have the space here to discuss all variations of this strategy, it seems safe to 
say that they all face considerable objections15. Hence, I will not pursue this first 
strategy here. Rather, I will pursue a second strategy to accommodate agent-relative 
reasons within AVR and specify which valuable entities agents respond to when 
they act on their agent-relative reasons. My claim will be that when you and I both 
try to save my daughter, we respond to agent-neutrally valuable entities but to 
different ones. And since we respond to different entities, we have different 
reasons. To demonstrate this, I start with project-dependent reasons and discuss 
them in some detail. Subsequently, I show that the results of this discussion 
generalize to relationship-dependent reasons and restrictions. 
 
4.a Project-dependent reasons 
 
15 It underlies the many attempts to accommodate agent-relative reasons within a consequentialist 
framework, such as rule-consequentialism, indirect consequentialism, motive consequentialism, 
etc. It is also the background of Barry Maguire’s (2017) recent attempt to reconcile agent-relative 
reasons with an agent-neutral, value-first view. And it can be found in nonconsequentialist 
attempts to explain partiality within a value-based view, such as Oddie (2005).  
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Which entity does an agent respond to when he acts on a project-dependent 
reason? An obvious answer seems to be that he responds to the value of the end 
the project is based on. For example, if my project is to write a book on agent-
relative reasons, and if this end is genuinely valuable, then I respond to the value of 
this end by spending a weekend outlining a chapter of the book. And if your 
project is to run a marathon, and if that end is genuinely valuable, then you respond 
to the value of that end by spending the weekend training for stamina. Call this the 
straightforward account of project-dependent reasons. 
This straightforward account has several advantages. It explains the intuition that 
agents have no reason to pursue immoral projects. For instance, according to the 
straightforward account, a member of the Ku Klux Klan has no reason to burn 
churches because his project is not based on a valuable end. Furthermore, the 
account is in line with (at least some aspects of) the phenomenology of pursuing 
projects. We often take ourselves to respond to the value of our project when we 
pursue it. If you are fed up with training for the marathon, you might gain new 
motivation by focusing on what an achievement it will be to cross the finish line. 
Nevertheless, I think that the straightforward account falls short. First, it does not 
really account for agent-relative reasons. If completing a marathon and writing a 
book on agent-relative reasons are both valuable ends, then I seem to have just as 
much reason to train for stamina as I have reason to work on a chapter for the 
book. According to the straightforward account, what is relevant is whether the 
end is valuable, not whether it is my project. Thus, the question remains why the 
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one valuable end gives me agent-relative reasons for action, whereas the other does 
not. Furthermore, why should I have reason to pursue my project myself, rather than 
to help others to achieve the valuable goal? Suppose that someone else can write a 
much better book on agent-relative reasons than me. Why should it be an 
appropriate response to the value of this end to try to write the book myself? It 
would seem more appropriate to help the other person write the better book. 
Second, phenomenological considerations not only support the straightforward 
account but also speak against it. We often regard the fact that some project is ours 
as equally reason-providing as the fact that the project aims at a valuable end 
(Betzler 2004). If I am frustrated with the slow progress of my book and cease to 
consider finishing it a valuable achievement, I might gain new motivation by 
thinking about the time and energy that I have already invested in the project. 
Third, the straightforward account has problems accounting for projects that are 
based on unrealizable ends. Suppose that my project is to help keep global warming 
below 2°C. At some point, I might realize that this goal is unachievable. Yet, it does 
not seem unreasonable for me to carry on with my project and educate people 
about the dangers of global warming, write petitions to politicians, and so on. This 
is difficult to explain if project-dependent reasons were based solely on the value of 
a project’s end, given that this value will never be realized. 
A better account of project-dependent reasons starts from a different 
understanding of the value of a project. When we talk about the value of a project, 
we can either refer to the valuable end the project is based on or we can refer to the 
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value of pursuing the project. It is this latter kind of value that agents respond to 
when they act on their project-dependent reasons. 
Consider what it means to respond appropriately to some value V. One possible 
way of responding appropriately to V is to maximize V, but there are also other 
candidates—take, for example, Joseph Raz’s (2001) distinction between recognizing 
value, respecting value, and engaging with value. Recognizing value involves 
“regarding objects in ways consistent with their value” (161). Respecting value 
involves the stance “not to destroy, and furthermore, to preserve what is of value” 
(162). Engaging with value involves making the value a part of one’s life, making 
oneself emotionally vulnerable to the value, etc. According to Raz, this latter kind 
of value response is the most appropriate one, since value is ultimately realized 
when it is engaged with (163). It is also the most demanding one, since it requires 
agents to make use of their limited resources (time, money, energy, etc.). 
Pursuing a project is a way of engaging with value. Once I adopt the project of 
writing a book on agent-relative reasons, I engage with the value of that intellectual 
achievement. I make this value part of my life, and I make myself emotionally 
vulnerable to it: I am prone to feel frustrated if my work is not going well, to feel 
proud if I have managed to write a chapter that satisfies my standards, and so on. 
When an agent pursues a project, she engages with value—namely with the value of 




As a way of engaging with value, pursuing a project is intrinsically valuable. This 
intrinsic value can be brought out in two different ways. First, as Thomas Hurka 
(2001) has convincingly argued, appropriate responses to value—whatever they 
are—are intrinsically good. Compare two worlds, W1 and W2. W1 contains both 
suffering and no compassion, whereas W2 contains the same amount of suffering 
as well as compassion. Intuitively, W2 seems to be the better world due to the 
compassion. Compassion is an appropriate response to the (dis-)value of suffering, 
and since the mere occurrence of compassion in W2 makes it better independent of 
any further consequences (the amount of suffering is the same), this suggests that it 
is intrinsically good to respond appropriately to value. Of course, compassion is an 
attitude not an action, but it seems unproblematic to extend this claim to actions: 
acting in a way that is an appropriate response to value is intrinsically good, 
independently of any other consequences that the action might bring about. 
Second, by adopting a project, an agent structures (parts of) her life and brings (at 
least some of) her desires, intentions, emotions, etc. into a coherent whole. She 
therefore unifies quite disparate elements. And according to an attractive 
metaphysical view of value, value supervenes on the unification of disparate 
elements into complex wholes (Nozick 1981; Oddie 2005; Kelly 2014). It is better 
to live a structured life than to live an unstructured life, and since pursuing a project 
consists in structuring (at least parts of) one’s life, this gives an independent 
explanation of why it is valuable to pursue projects. Taken together, these two 
considerations suggest that pursuing projects is intrinsically valuable, and that there 
is value in projects over and above the value of their ends. 
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If pursuing a project is intrinsically valuable, then there is also reason to respond 
appropriately to this value. Such appropriate responses include attitudes as well as 
actions. An agent responds appropriately to the value of pursuing a project by 
being proud of the project or by hoping that she will carry it out successfully, and 
she also responds appropriately to the value of pursuing a project by performing 
actions that help facilitate the project’s success. In other words, she responds 
appropriately to the value of pursuing a project by acting on her project-dependent 
reasons. Since pursuing a project is a way of engaging with value and is therefore 
itself an appropriate value response—namely a response to a valuable end—acting 
on a project-dependent reason is an appropriate response to an appropriate value 
response. In other words, acting on a project-dependent reason is a second-order 
value response. 
Understanding agent-relative reasons in terms of second-order value responses 
accommodates them within an AVR framework. Agent-relative reasons do not 
arise first and foremost because it is appropriate for different agents to respond 
differently to the same agent-neutrally valuable entities; they arise because it can be 
appropriate for different agents to respond to different agent-neutrally valuable 
entities in a situation. You and I have different project-dependent reasons because 
we have different first-order value responses and we have reason to respond to our 
different first-order value responses.16 
 
16 An editor of this journal has pressed me to explain why invoking the higher-order level of value 
response is necessary to explain agent-relative reasons. Doesn’t Raz already solve the puzzle 
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Some readers might find this account implausible. I have claimed that practical 
reasons are reasons to respond appropriately to agent-neutral value, but one might 
think that the value of a first-order value response is agent-relative value since it is 
the agent’s first-order value response. However, the mere fact that it is the agent’s 
response does not make the value agent-relative. The value is agent-relational: its 
existence depends on valuing agents.17 But that does not mean that it is also agent-
relative in the sense that its good-making features include reference to the agent. My 
appropriate value response exists because of me, but the fact that my appropriate 
value response is good does not depend on me. The value of an appropriate value 
response is agent-relational, yet agent-neutral, value. 
Other readers might object that, if pursuing projects adds value to a person’s life, 
then this means that it is good for a person to pursue projects, and that the “good 
for”-relation expresses agent-relative value. However, independently of the 
 
insofar as the appropriateness of the engagement response already accounts for agent-relative 
reasons, so that the fact that doing A presents a way for S to engage with an agent-neutral value 
V is an agent-relative reason for S to do A? While my account is close to this idea, I think that it 
is not enough to rely merely on the engagement response to explain agent-relative reasons. Most 
importantly, relying merely on the engagement response does not explain deontological 
restrictions because respecting a restriction is not a way of engaging with value. By contrast, my 
account gives a unified explanation of project-dependent reasons, relationship-dependent 
reasons, and restrictions. I will return to this below. 
17 I take the term “agent-relational” from Schroeder (2007b). However, Schroeder talks about 
agent-relational reasons, not agent-relational value. 
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question whether the “good for”-relation does in fact express agent-relative value,18 
the fact that pursuing projects adds value to my life does not entail that the 
structuring of my life is good for me. After all, I can adopt extremely self-denying 
projects. In such a case, my life is structured, and this adds value to my life, but it is 
not necessarily good for me. Hence, even if the “good for”-relation expresses 
agent-relative value, it does not follow that the value of pursuing personal projects 
is agent-relative because pursuing projects is not necessarily good for the agent. 
Still, some readers might insist that even if pursuing projects is not necessarily good 
for an agent, the mere fact that it adds value to a life makes the value agent-relative. 
But this does not follow either. Suppose that the Great Consequentialist Project 
has succeeded, and we have made the world as good as possible. This seems to add 
value to everybody’s life even though it is not necessarily good for everybody (it 
allows for trade-offs between people. Ceteris paribus, living in the best possible world 
is better than living in a world that is not quite as good. But this does not show that 
the success of the Great Consequentialist Project has agent-relative value. On the 
contrary, it is a paradigmatic case of agent-neutral value.  
I conclude that pursuing personal projects is agent-neutrally good. For its good-
making features do not depend on the identity of the agent, and its value is neither 
agent-relative in the sense that it is necessarily good for the agent to pursue 
 
18 Much depends on how to understand the “good for”-relation. This is a contested matter, and I 




projects, nor is its value agent-relative in the sense that pursuing projects adds value 
to a life. Since the value of pursuing a project generates agent-relative project-
dependent reasons, and since the value of a project is agent-neutral value, it follows 
that agent-neutral value generates agent-relative reasons. 
Two open questions remain at this point. First, I have criticized the straightforward 
account of project-dependent reasons because it implies that I have just as much 
reason to train for stamina as I have reason to write a chapter for my book. What 
remains to be shown is that understanding agent-relative reasons in terms of 
second-order value responses fares better in this regard. Second, a decisive feature 
of agent-relative reasons is that they are reasons to take one’s own projects, 
relationships, or integrity as more important than the projects, relationships, or 
integrity of others, even though the projects, relationships, and integrity of others 
are equally agent-neutrally valuable.19 What remains to be shown is that 
understanding agent-relative reasons in terms of second-order value responses 
explains this feature. I will discuss these points in turn. 
Regarding the first point, the important difference between the straightforward 
account and the view proposed here is how the respective accounts specify what 
values agents respond to when they act on their project-dependent reasons. On the 
straightforward account, I have just as much reason to work on a chapter of my 
book as I have reason to train for stamina because in each case, I respond directly 
 
19 I thank an anonymous referee for helping me spell out this problem better than in an earlier 
version of the paper. 
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to an agent-neutral base-level value. On the view proposed here, this is not the 
case. When I work on the chapter for my book, I do not simply respond to the 
base-level value of that intellectual achievement, but to my own response to the 
base-level value. This explains why other agents who do not have the same first-
order value response to the base-level value do not have the same reason as me: 
they cannot respond to the value of that specific first-order value response. 
Of course, I could adopt the project of completing a marathon, and one could argue 
that the value of the athletic achievement of running a marathon gives every agent a 
reason to adopt a corresponding project, and that therefore every agent has the 
same reason to train for stamina after all. However, it is important to remember 
that pursuing projects is a way of engaging with value. Since engaging with value 
makes significant demands on agents and their resources (time, money, energy, 
etc.), nobody can engage with any possible value. Agents must choose with which 
values they engage. They have leeway in choosing their projects and they have 
reason to choose any project that is based on a valuable end. Hence, if both 
running a marathon and writing a book on agent-relative reasons are valuable ends, 
I have ceteris paribus just as much reason to choose the one project as I have reason 
to choose the other. However, once I have chosen a value with which to engage 
and have adopted a corresponding project, I need to invest my time, energy, and 




This brings me to the second point: the special normative force of agent-relative 
reasons. Whenever an agent acts on her agent-relative reasons, it is important that 
the agent herself performs some action or refrains from doing it, rather than helping 
others perform actions of that very type.20 For example, I have an agent-relative 
reason to facilitate the success of my project rather than helping some other person 
pursue her project. I also have an agent-relative reason to take care of my child 
even if, by neglecting my own child, I could bring another parent to take care of his 
or her child who would otherwise neglect the child. And I have a reason not to tell 
a lie even if my lie could prevent someone else from lying. This special significance 
of agent-relative reasons is the litmus test for deciding whether a reason is agent-
relative or not (Darwall 2006) and any account of agent-relative reasons must be 
able to make sense of it. 
How can the proposed view account for this special significance of agent-relative 
reasons? The first thing to remember is that an agent who acts on her project-
dependent reasons responds not merely to some value, but more specifically to the 
value of her own appropriate value response. This value only exists because she 
responds to value in the way that she does, and it includes structuring her life 
accordingly. She can only structure her life if she does not take herself to have just 
 
20 Many authors discuss this special normative force of agent-relative reasons in terms of 
nonmaximization: I have agent-relative reason to φ even if I could maximize respectively 
minimize actions of the very same type by not φ-ing. However, the special normative force of 
agent-relative reasons already occurs when maximization is not at issue. I thank an anonymous 
referee for helping me to clarify this. 
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as much reason to respond to her own project as she has to respond to the project 
of others. If an agent does not take herself to have special reason to respond to her 
own project, then she does not structure her life around the project’s end. After all, 
she always takes it as a salient possibility to do something else other than bringing 
her own actions, emotions, etc. into a coherent whole. And this means that the 
agent could not realize the value of her own value response if she does not take 
herself to have special reason to respond to her own value response rather than the 
value responses of others. 
Of course, an agent also has reason to respond to the agent-neutral value of 
someone else’s value response. But that other person’s value response also exists 
on the condition that the other person takes herself to have special reason to 
pursue her own project rather than helping others pursue their projects. In other 
words, my value response only exists because I take myself to have special reason 
to pursue my own project; the other person’s value response exists because she 
takes herself to have special reason to pursue her project. Thus, even if I respond 
to another person’s value response, the value to which I respond depends on the 
general principle that agents have special reason to take their own projects as more 
important than the projects of others. This means that by responding to the other 
person’s project, I affirm that appropriate value responses are proper objects of 
further value responses. And since such appropriate value responses are only 
possible if agents take themselves to have special reason to respond to their own 
value responses rather than the value responses of others, I indirectly affirm that I 
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have special reason to respond to my own project even if I respond to someone 
else’s value response. 
We can couch the underlying principle in terms of appropriateness. An appropriate 
response to a value is a pro-response, and that means that an appropriate response 
to a value should not make the very value it responds to impossible. But this would 
be the case if it were just as appropriate for an agent to respond to his own value 
response as it were for her to respond to the value responses of others. To say that 
an agent has as much reason to help others act on their project-dependent reasons 
as she has to act on her own means that it would be just as appropriate to do the 
one thing as the other. Since helping others to act on their project-dependent 
reasons implies not being able to perform acts that are part of the interconnected 
actions that constitute the structuring of her own life, this means that it would be 
just as appropriate to respond to one’s own value response as it would be to act in 
a way that makes one’s own value response impossible. Of course, the value that is 
potentially made impossible and the value that is responded to are not the same 
values: the former is my value response and the latter is the value response of 
someone else. However, for the other person it would also be just as appropriate to 
forsake her own value response for the sake of the value responses of others, and 
she could therefore also not structure her life around a value. In sum, if it were just 
as appropriate to respond to my own value response as it would be to respond to 
the value responses of others, then this would mean that an appropriate value 
response could threaten the very same value that it is a response to. It is therefore 
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more appropriate to focus on one’s own value response than it is to respond to the 
value responses of others. 
The special normative significance of project-dependent reasons can also be 
explained another way. When an agent structures her life around a value, then her 
actions at t gain much of their meaning from her actions at t1, t2, etc. Her reasons to 
perform various acts are thus intertwined, and every instance in which she acts on a 
project-dependent reason has significance beyond itself. The normative force of her 
project-dependent reasons therefore also extends beyond the individual situation in 
which a specific reason arises. By contrast, the normative force of her reason to 
help someone else pursue his project does not extend beyond itself. Hence, the 
agent’s projects have a normative significance for her that the projects of others do 
not. 
To conclude, project-dependent reasons can be accommodated within an agent-
neutral AVR framework by understanding them in terms of second-order value 
responses. What remains to be shown is that the account generalized to other kinds 
of agent-relative reasons as well. 
 
4.b Relationship-dependent reasons 
It seems unproblematic to extend the account to relationship-dependent reasons. 
Personal relationships are like projects in many ways. They too are ways of 
engaging with value, namely the value of persons (Velleman 1999; Rosati 2008; 
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Keller 2013). Furthermore, they structure the lives of their participants in a similar 
way as do projects. In fact, relationships constitute complex unity to an even 
greater degree. Not only do they structure the plans, actions, and desires of an 
individual agent and bring them into a coherent whole, they also bring plans, 
actions, and desires of two individual agents into one coherent whole. Relationships 
are therefore intrinsically good in the same way projects are, and this means that 
they are also objects of appropriate value responses. And one way to respond 
appropriately to the value of one’s relationship is to act on one’s relationship-
dependent reasons and spend time with one’s friend, or care for one’s child. Thus, 
the explanation of project-dependent reasons applies to relationship-dependent 
reasons as well, and so does the explanation of their special normativity.  
Understanding relationship-dependent reasons in terms of second-order value 
responses has an important further advantage. It helps resolve a prominent debate 
in the ethics of personal relationships. Some authors claim that relationship-
dependent reasons are grounded in the value of a relationship (Jeske 2008; Tan 
2010; Seglow 2013). Others argue that such reasons are grounded in the value of 
the person that we have the relationship with (Keller 2013). On the view proposed 
here, there is truth in both views. When we act on a relationship-dependent reason, 
we respond appropriately to the value of a relationship and, in this sense, the 
reason stems from the value of the relationship. However, the relationship is 
valuable (and thus reason-giving) because it is an appropriate response to the value 
of the other person and, in this sense, the ultimate ground of the relationship-
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dependent reason is the value of the other person. Thus, when we act on a 
relationship-dependent reason, we respond directly to the value of a relationship 
but we also respond indirectly to the value of the other person. 
 
4.c Restrictions 
Deontological restrictions do not obviously fit the model of project- and 
relationship-dependent reasons. Neither is respecting a restriction a way of 
engaging with value, nor do restrictions structure the lives of the agents who 
respect them. Nevertheless, restrictions can also be interpreted in terms of second-
order value responses. To show this, it is again important to ask which value an 
agent responds to when she respects a restriction. 
One possible answer is that restrictions are appropriate responses to disvalues, and 
that by refraining from lying or killing, an agent responds appropriately to the 
disvalue of lying or killing. But this answer does not explain the agent-relativity of 
restrictions: refraining from telling a lie and preventing someone else from telling a 
lie would be responses to the very same value, and I would have just as much 
reason to do the one as the other even if the latter includes telling a lie myself. This 
first way of explaining restrictions lets them even appear paradoxical (Scheffler 
1982; McNaughton and Rawling 2013). If restrictions are grounded in the disvalue 
of certain act types, then it seems paradoxical to hold that an agent should respect a 
restriction even if she could minimize the occurrence of such act types by violating 
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a restriction herself. Rather, she should lie when she can thereby prevent even more 
agents from lying. But this is not how we conceive of restrictions. 
Another possibility is that restrictions are appropriate responses to the value of 
persons, and that refraining from torturing a person or from lying to her are 
appropriate responses to her value. However, this view leaves restrictions 
somewhat unmotivated. Why do I respond appropriately to the value of a person 
by refraining from torturing her rather than by preventing her from being tortured? 
The value of a person surely generates reasons to help her avoid mistreatment, and 
thus both respecting restrictions as well as violating them in order to prevent 
violations by others could be appropriate responses to the value of persons.21 
A third and better approach understands restrictions in terms of second-order 
value responses. Agents do not respond appropriately to the value of persons 
merely by respecting restrictions individually. Rather they do so by establishing 
social relations that include deontological rules. When agents collectively create 
social relations with deontological rules, they thereby collectively respond 
appropriately to their respective value as free and equals. Deontological restrictions 
protect the agency of persons, and this enables them to form and pursue life plans. 
In this sense, restrictions are appropriate responses to the value of persons as free 
 
21 See Lippert-Rasmussen (2009) who argues that the moral status of a person can be described as 
“inviolability,” but also as “unignorability.” In the latter case, agents must not ignore potential 
victims of the violation of restrictions, which includes those persons who the agent could prevent 
from becoming victims by violating a restriction herself. 
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(or autonomous) beings. And since deontological rules are universal rules in the 
sense that they equally protect all members of the moral community, agents also 
express their status as equals by creating social relations with such rules.22 Thus, 
social relations that include deontological rules are similar to projects and 
relationships in that they are also an appropriate response to value. And they share 
another similarity. Respecting restrictions might not count as engaging with value, 
and restrictions might not structure the lives of individual agents, but they structure 
the actions and intentions of different agents insofar as what is permissible for me 
to do influences what is permissible for you to do and vice versa. Therefore, social 
relations that include restrictions exemplify at least some degree of unified 
complexity. 
Since social relations with deontological rules are an appropriate response to value, 
they are intrinsically good and therefore objects of appropriate value responses. 
And agents respond appropriately to the value of such social relations by respecting 
the deontological rules that govern them. This explains why an agent does not have 
as much reason to respect a restriction herself as she has reason to prevent others 
from violating a restriction, and it explains why deontological restrictions are not 
 
22 By claiming that the value of a person is the base-level value to which agents respond when 
they respect a deontological restriction, my account is similar to Frances Kamm’s (1992, 2007) or 
Thomas Nagel’s (1995) accounts of deontology. I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out 
the similarities between my account and Kamm’s. 
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paradoxical.23 Restrictions only appear paradoxical if one understands them as 
responses to the disvalue of certain act types. Understanding restrictions in terms 
of second-order value responses rejects this assumption. One might argue that if 
restrictions are appropriate responses to the value of a certain kind of social 
relations, and if violating restrictions is intrinsically bad in virtue of being an 
inappropriate response to this value, then the appropriate response to the value of 
such social relations is to maximize compliance with the deontological rules that 
govern them. But at this point, a similar response is available here as the one that is 
available in the case of projects and relationships. It is only possible to realize the 
value of social relations that include deontological rules if agents are not taken to 
have as much reason to respect restrictions as they have preventing others from 
violating them. If agents had as much reason to prevent someone from lying as 
they have reason not to lie themselves (and if they would therefore be morally 
permitted to lie in order to prevent someone else from lying), it could hardly be 
said that their social relations are governed by deontological rules. Once we accept 
that restrictions are responses to the value of certain kinds of social relations rather 
than responses to the disvalue of certain act types, we can account for their special 
agent-relative normative force. 
 




Another advantage of the view developed here is that it allows for the possibility of 
a threshold deontology.24 Any plausible deontology must permit or even require 
agents to violate a restriction if this is the only way to prevent catastrophic 
disasters. Understanding restrictions in terms of higher-order value responses 
accommodates this. Agents are not permitted to tell one lie in order to prevent two 
lies from being told, but they are permitted—or even required—to tell a lie if that is 
the only way to prevent the whole socially embodied set of norms that constitutes 
the common appropriate response from collapsing. I cannot spell out this possible 
threshold deontology in detail here, but it is worth noting that the view proposed 




An agent-neutral, value-first framework can accommodate agent-relative reasons. 
The important insight is that appropriate value responses can occur on different 
levels, and that appropriate responses to agent-neutral values are themselves of 
agent-neutral value. Despite important differences between project-related reasons, 
relationship-dependent reasons, and restrictions, there is a unifying framework 
which explains them. They all can be described in terms of second-order value 
 
24 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to me. 
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responses—that is, in terms of appropriate responses to appropriate value 
responses. 
In closing, I would like to mention some advantages of th proposed view. First, it 
meets criteria that a convincing account of agent-relativity should meet: it covers 
different kinds of agent-relative reasons and it explains why agents ought to act on 
their own agent-relative reasons rather than helping others acting on theirs (or 
maximizing general compliance with such reasons). Second, the view nicely 
accounts for the two-sided phenomenology of acting on agent-relative reasons. 
When pursuing a project, we might take ourselves to respond directly to the 
valuable goal on which the project is based, or we might take ourselves to respond 
to the fact that we are pursuing this specific project. Similarly, I might help my 
friend out of concern for her or out of concern for our friendship. And I might 
respect a restriction out of respect for the other person or out of concern for the 
moral rules that ground the restriction. All these possibilities seem adequate and the 
view developed here explains why. The actual object of response is the agent’s first-
order value response and it is adequate to focus on the actual object of one’s 
response. But since the base-level value grounds the first-order value response, it 
can also be adequate to focus on the ground of the actual object of one’s 
response—in a sense, that value shimmers through. 
Another advantage of this view is that it does not understand agent-relative reasons 
and agent-neutral reasons as incommensurable. Since they are both ultimately 
grounded in agent-neutral value, it should (at least in principle) be possible to weigh 
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them against each other and determine what an agent ought to do, all things 
considered, when they conflict. This is an advantage because if agent-relative 
reasons and agent-neutral reasons were incommensurable, then every case in which 
an agent-neutral reason conflicts with an agent-relative reason constitutes a 
dilemma, and that is hardly convincing. I cannot discuss here exactly how this 
weighing works; it depends on how values can be compared in general and how 
AVR accounts for the strength of practical reasons. The important point is that we 
should not assume that agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons are 
incommensurable merely because the former involve an essential reference to the 
agent while the latter do not. 
Of course, explaining agent-relative reasons in terms of second-order value 
responses is not the only way to account for such reasons. What I hope to have 
shown, however, is that agent-relative reasons pose no problem for a value-based 
theory of practical reasons that understands all value as agent-neutral. Even if all 
value is agent-neutral, agent-relative reasons emerge naturally from what it means 
to respond appropriately to value. 
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